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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIRST AMENDMENT - FREEDOM OF SPEECH
- ZONING AUTHORITY - ADULT ENTERTAINMENT - The United
States Supreme Court has held that a zoning ordinance which ex-
cludes all forms of live entertainment, including nonobscene nude
dancing, from an otherwise broad range of permissible uses violates
the first amendment.
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
In June 1973, James F. Schad' opened an adult bookstore in a
small borough in Camden County, New Jersey.2 The store was lo-
cated in an area of the community zoned for commercial use." Ini-
tially, the store sold adult books, magazines, and films, but later
Shad obtained amusement licenses permitting him to add coin-op-
erated devices to the store.' These devices enabled a customer to
watch an adult movie by entering a booth and inserting a coin.' In
July 1976, Schad installed an additional coin-operated device
which allowed a person to view a live dancer who usually per-
formed nude behind a glass panel."
The Borough of Mount Ephraim filed a complaint in the New
Jersey municipal court against Shad,7 claiming that the exhibition
of live nude dancing violated the Borough's zoning ordinance.8 The
1. The storeowners were James F. Schad and Juliette Ann DiLuciano. Brief for Appel-
lants at 1.
2. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). The store was located on
the Black Horse Turnpike, a major highway linking Atlantic City with Camden County and
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Id. at 85 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
3. Id. See infra note 9 for the text of the ordinance.
4. 452 U.S. at 62.
5. Brief for Appellants at 4.
6. Id.
7. See supra note 1. Complaints were also filed against Juliette Ann DiLuciano and
the store itself, 613 Corporation. Brief for appellee at 1.
8. The zoning ordinance, MouNT EPHRADA, N.J. CODE, § 99-15B (1979), established
three categories of zones. The first zoning category restricted use in the area to single-family
dwellings. 452 U.S. at 63 & n.1. The second type permitted single-family dwellings, town-
houses, and garden apartments. Id. The third type was zoned for commercial use. Id.
259
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ordinance described a number of permitted uses in a commercial
zone,9 but did not provide for live entertainment.10 Even though
the municipal court interpreted the ordinance as a prohibition of
all live entertainment including live nude dancing,11 it determined
that the ordinance was valid, found the defendants guilty, and im-
posed fines.12
The storeowners appealed to the Camden County Court where a
trial de novo was held on the municipal court's record."3 The Cam-
den County Court rejected the storeowners' two grounds of appeal
and affirmed the decision of the municipal court.1 4 The first
ground considered by the county court embodied the storeowners'
claim of selectivity in the Borough's enforcement of its ordinance."
The court noted that other local businesses were permitted to offer
live entertainment, but concluded that because these uses existed
prior to the enactment of the ordinance, no improper or selective
enforcement of the ordinance was present.16
9. 452 U.S. at 63. MOUNT EPHRAIM, N.J. CODE, § 99-15B (1979) provides:
B. Principle permitted uses on the land and in buildings.
(1) Offices and banks; taverns; restaurants and luncheonettes for sitdown dinners
only and with no drive-in facilities; automobile sales; retail stores . . .; repair shops
.; cleaners and laundries; pet stores; and nurseries. Offices may, in addition, be
permitted to a group of four (4) stores or more without additional parking, provided
the offices do not exceed the equivalent of twenty percent (20%) of the gross floor
area of the stores.
MOUNT EPHRAIM, N.J. CODE, § 99-4 (1979) provides that "[a]ll uses not expressly permitted
in this chapter are prohibited." 452 U.S. at 64.
10. See supra note 9.
11. 452 U.S. at 64. In its complaint, the Borough interpreted the zoning ordinance as
restricting all uses not expressly provided for and, therefore, as a prohibition of live nude
dancing. Brief for Appellee at 3.
12. 452 U.S. it 64. The municipal court, interpreting the ordinance as a prohibition of
all live entertainment including live nude dancing, determined that, although live nude
dancing is protected by the first amendment, the zoning ordinance was a valid regulation,
neither overly broad nor unduly vague. The storeowners claimed that the Borough's inter-
pretation and application of the ordinance violated their constitutional rights because live
nude dancing was a form of expression protected by the first and fourteenth amendments of
the United States Constitution. The storeowners also claimed that the ordinance suppressed
rather than regulated this form of expression and was unduly vague and overly broad. Brief
for Appellants at 5-6.
13. 452 U.S. at 64.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. The building inspector and the chief of police testified that the establishments
offering live music were permitted to do so only because this use of the premises preceded
the enactment of the zoning ordinance and therefore qualified as a nonconforming use. Id.
at n.3.
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The storeowners' second contention was based on the first and
fourteenth amendments. 17 The Camden County Court acknowl-
edged that the first amendment protects live nude dancing, but
found that protection was not warranted when only a zoning ordi-
nance, prohibiting all forms of live entertainment, was involved. 18
The court relied on Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.'9 for
the proposition that a zoning ordinance is not automatically inva-
lid solely because it places restrictions on the commercial exploita-
tion of material protected by the first amendment.20
On appeal, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New
Jersey affirmed the convictions for essentially the same reasons.2 1
An appeal to the Supreme Court of New Jersey for further review
was denied.22 The storeowners then appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.2 ' The Court granted their appeal to determine
whether the storeowners' first and fourteenth amendment right to
free expression had been violated by the imposition of criminal
penalties under an ordinance which prohibited live entertainment,
including nonobscene nude dancing.2 4
Justice White, writing for the majority, 5 held that the ordi-
nance, as interpreted by the lower courts, denied the storeowners
their constitutional right to free expression.26 Justice White
17. Id. at 64.
18. Id.
19. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). In American Mini Theatres, the Court upheld a zoning ordi-
nance which restricted the location of new theaters showing sexually explicit adult movies,
despite a first amendment challenge. Id. at 62.
20. 452 U.S. at 64-65. The Camden County Court rejected the balance of the store-
owners' contentions and found them guilty as charged, affirming the fine. Id.
21. Id. at 65.
22. Id. The denial came in Borough of Mount Ephraim v. Schad, 82 N.J. 287, 412 A.2d
793 (1980).
23. 452 U.S. at 65. In their appeal, the storeowners also claimed that the zoning ordi-
nance constituted a denial of the process and equal protection because customers were per-
mitted access to coin-operated movie booths, but were denied access to booths from which
they could view nude dancing. 452 U.S. at 65 n.4. The Supreme Court did not address these
claims because the majority sustained the storeowners' first amendment challenge to the
ordinance. Id.
24. Id. at 65.
25. Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell joined in the decision
of the majority. Id. at 62.
26. Id. at 65. The Supreme Court noted that it was bound by the New Jersey courts'
interpretation of the Mount Ephraim code, that live entertainment was not a permitted use
in any Borough establishment. Id. See supra note 11-12 and accompanying text. The Su-
preme Court also noted that the Camden County Court did not make a determination on
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stressed that the ordinance, construed to ban all live entertain-
ment within the Borough,2 7 barred a substantial amount to expres-
sion protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. 8 He em-
phasized that an entertainment program may not be prohibited
solely because it contains nudity, which is protected to a certain
extent by the first amendment."
Justice White then directed his attention to the constitutional
protection accorded all forms of live entertainment, because the
Borough's ordinance was interpreted as excluding all live en-
tertainment, and not just nonobscene nude dancing. 0 He ex-
plained that the first amendment requires adequate justification
for the exclusion of categories of protected speech from the range
of permissible commercial uses in the Borough, and found that the
ordinance, on its face, did not provide this justification." While
acknowledging the wide latitude given a municipality to zone and
restrain land use, he tempered this declaration by stressing that it
must be achieved within constitutional bounds or suffer invalida-
tion on review.3 2 According to Justice White, the standard for re-
viewing a zoning ordinance which treads on a protected expression
is that it be "narrowly drawn '3 and advance a "substantial gov-
ernment interest. 3 4 Since the zoning ordinance interfered with a
the permissibility of non-live entertainment. 452 U.S. at 67 n.6.
27. The Borough's code provided that all uses not expressly permitted by the code
were prohibited. 452 U.S. at 67. See supra note 9.
28. 452 U.S. at 65.
29. Id. at 66. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211 (1975); Jenkins
v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974).
30. 452 U.S. at 66. The majority held that the storeowners could stress the impact of
the ordinance on all forms of live entertainment because their defense to the lower court
convictions centered on the first amendment. Id. See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 114 (1972) (a party can raise an overbreadth challenge even when his actions could
be constitutionally prohibited by a properly limited law, because overbroad laws, like vague
ones, deter privileged activities).
31. 452 U.S. at 67. See supra notes 28-29.
32. 452 U.S. at 68. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 514 (1977)(Ste-
vens, J., concurring)(zoning power must be exercised within constitutional limits).
33. 452 U.S. at 68.
34. Id. Justice White observed that Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) held
that even legitimate state objectives may be insufficient justification when the regulation
interferes with fundamental personal rights. 452 U.S. at 69-70. He also noted that Village of
Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980), required that the sub-
stantiality of the government interests be assessed, and would permit restrictions on this
type of speech only where no less intrusive means existed to further the state's legitimate
interest. 452 U.S. at 70. Land use regulations affecting only property interests are governed
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protected form of expression, the Court stated it must carefully
scrutinize the justifications advanced by the Borough for its prohi-
bition of all live entertainment and determine whether less intru-
sive means existed to further any actual justification presented."
The Court distinguished American Mini Theatres, on which the
lower court relied, on the basis that the restriction in that case
imposed a minimal burden on protected expression because it did
not attempt to ban all live entertainment, but only dispersed the
locations available for adult movie theaters."8 Detroit officials, in
American Mini Theatres, had justified that minimal burden by ad-
vancing evidence which indicated that an increase in the number
of adult theaters in limited confines resulted in accelerated deteri-
oration of surrounding neighborhoods.37 The restriction in Schad,
however, was a total ban on all live entertainment.
Justice White next addressed the Borough's three justifications
for prohibiting live entertainment." First, the Borough had ex-
plained that it was seeking to mold a commercial area that pro-
vided only for the immediate needs of its inhabitants.39 The major-
ity, rejecting this justification as insignificant, viewed the
numerous uses permitted by the ordinance0 and observed that far
more than just a handful of services were available to the commu-
nity and that, with exception to live entertainment, it was difficult
to find a commercial service or enterprise not obtainable. 4'
The Borough also argued that through its zoning ordinance it
had sought to prevent problems such as traffic congestion, trash
accumulation, and the need for additional police and medical facil-
ities that are associated with live entertainment. 2 Because the
by the lower "rational relationship" standard, requiring that the restriction be rationally
related to a legitimate state concern. 452 U.S. at 68 n.7.
35. 452 U.S. at 71.
36. Id. See 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
37. See 427 U.S. at 71-72.
38. 452 U.S. at 72-76.
39. Id. at 72-73. The purpose of the commercial zone, set forth in § 99-15A of the
Mount Ephraim Code, was to encouraged shopping center-type development and a concen-
tration of commercial uses into few locations. Id. at 63 n.2. The Borough's counsel asserted
that the stores would enable residents to purchase the few items-bread, milk, gifts-they
might forget to buy outside the Borough. Id. at 72 n.13.
40. The list of permitted uses included retail stores, motels, lumber stores, offices, car
showrooms, barber shops, cleaners, and restaurants. See supra note 9.




Borough failed to demonstrate that live entertainment had a
greater effect on such problems than did the uses permitted by the
ordinance, the majority concluded that this justification was un-
founded.' 3 Justice White viewed this explanation as particularly
inappropriate because the Borough granted the storeowners a li-
cense to exhibit nude dancing on film and offer other adult prod-
ucts while denying a request to allow live entertainment." He pos-
tulated that even if some forms of live entertainment might create
special situations warranting regulation, any regulation promul-
gated must be more narrowly drawn than this challenged ordi-
nance, and must address only the particular zoning problems asso-
ciated with that type of live entertainment."5
Finally, the Borough contended that its ordinance sufficed as a
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction.'6 Justice White ob-
served that in Grayned v. City of Rockford,"7 the Court had held
that the reasonableness of the challenged regulation as a time,
place, and manner restriction is determined by comparing the suit-
ability of the protected expression with the normal activity of the
regulated place.' 8 He found that the evidence presented by Mount
Ephraim failed to establish that live entertainment was incompati-
ble with the normal activity allowed in the Borough's commercial
zone.
49
Additionally, the Court noted that Grayned demanded that a
valid time, place, and manner restriction must provide alternative
avenues of expression in addition to advancing significant state in-
terests." The Borough suggested that live entertainment was ex-
cludable since it was abundantly available in nearby Philadelphia
43. Id. at 73-74.
44. Id. at 74.
45. Id. Justice White concluded that the Borough had not established that its goals
could not be met by an enactment less intrusive on protected expression. Id.
46. Id. The reasonableness of regulations restricting the time, place, and manner of
expression is determined by the nature of the place in question. Id. at 75.
47. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
48. Id. at 116-17.
49. 452 U.S. at 75.
50. Id. See 408 U.S. at 116, 118; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 530, 535 (1980) (commission regulation that prohibited inclusion in monthly electrical
bills of inserts discussing issues of public policy held violative of freedom of speech); Vir-
ginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (Vir-
ginia statute that made advertising the prices of prescription drugs conduct subjecting phar-
macists to license suspension or revocation held violative of the first amendment).
264 Vol. 21:259
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and in other areas of Camden County outside the Borough limits."
The majority admitted the possible appropriateness of this argu-
ment if Camden County had been organized with county-wide zon-
ing; however, no such county-wide plan existed.5' According to Jus-
tice White, the Borough also failed to produce evidence indicating
the availability of live entertainment in a close proximity.53 Justice
White theorized that even if live entertainment was shown to be
available in nearby areas, a Mount Ephraim resident's avenue to
this expression should not always necessitate an out-of-town jour-
ney if the activity is appropriate and compatible with permitted
uses.5' The Court then reversed the convictions and remanded the
case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion . 5
Justice Blackmun's concurrence focused on two issues he be-
lieved important in this developing area of the law." He stated
that the long-attendant presumption of validity attached to the ex-
ercise of a local authority's zoning power is inappropriate when the
regulation encumbers a right protected by the first amendment. 57
To justify a restriction on the freedom of expression in the com-
munity, Justice Blackmun demanded a sufficient foundation for
any asserted government concern.
58
Justice Blackmun also considered the Borough's "availability in
nearby areas" justification." Following the majority's dismissal of
this theory, he found it improper to require a resident of one com-
munity to infiltrate a nearby territory to exercise his first amend-
ment rights, because this would make the resident's right of access
to such expression contingent on the decisions of a community in
which he had no political voice.60 Justice Blackmun recognized
51. 452 U.S. at 76.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 7677. "One is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appro-
priate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other places." Id. (quot-
ing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)).
55. 452 U.S. at 77.
56. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
57. Id. Justice Blackmun emphasized that this situation demands a "narrowly drawn"
ordinance which furthers a "sufficiently substantial" interest. Id.
58. Id. Justice Blackmun did not view this scrutiny insurmountable, but stressed that
minimal scrutiny requiring only some rational relation to the community interest was insuf-
ficient. Id.
59. Id. at 78 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
60. Id. Justice Blackmun hypothesized that if such a contention became law, a nearby
1982 265
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that American Mini Theatres did not in any manner accept this
argument beyond the confines of a single political subdivision. He
expressed great concern for those minority members of the com-
munity who wish to practice a form of protected expression within
their borough, which the principal sector of the community finds
incompatible with its concept of decent life.' He admitted that
zoning is a proper tool to beutilized by a municipality to protect
the community's character; however, Justice Blackmun regarded
the protection of diversity of ideas as a touchstone to democratic
thought, requiring that unpopular expression, which also warrants
first amendment protection, find judicial bulwarks from assault by
majoritarian sectors of the community seeking to ban it.
62
Justice Powell, who also wrote in concurrence,63 agreed with the
majority's view that the Borough failed to introduce sufficient evi-
dence to justify such a broad restriction on protected expression."'
He pointed out, however, that with a more narrowly drawn ordi-
nance, a community could prohibit or limit all commercial en-
tertainment. 5 Such an action, Justice Powell stated, could be ac-
ceptable in a residential area where all commercial uses were
prohibited. 6 Accepting the majority's view, Justice Powell found
the Borough's ordinance underinclusive by permitting uses that
went far beyond just providing for the immediate needs of re-
sidents, and overinclusive by prohibiting all live entertainment.6 7
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, filed a separate
opinion" in which he noted that the majority had viewed the case
as founded in the first amendment and, therefore, had required the
Borough to overcome a presumption of invalidity.6 9 To do so, he
observed, the majority had required Mount Ephraim to demon-
city, such as Philadelphia, could become obligated to provide noncitizens with access to
adult materials simply because other communities had earlier banned such access. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 79 (Blackmun, J., concurring).






68. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 80 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens theorized that if evidence had
been presented showing that the change in the defendants' business had disturbed the com-
munity, then the Borough could have prohibited it. Id. at 83. (Stevens, J., concurring).
266 Vol. 21:259
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strate that the ordinance was narrowly drawn and that it effecu-
tated a sufficiently substantial government interest." He also indi-
cated that if the case were analyzed from the perspective adopted
by Chief Justice Burger-that. the Borough's ordinance repre-
sented a solitary attempt to exclude nude dancing from a residen-
tial area-the storeowners would have been faced with overcoming
the presumption that the ordinance was constitutionally valid.
7
1
This would have necessitated a display that the Borough had ap-
plied the exclusion selectively, or that similar expression was not
sufficiently available in areas close to the Borough limits.
72
Justice Stevens believed that the issue should be addressed from
a different angle. He rejected the Chief Justice's approach, finding
the record too opaque to enable the Court to adequately character-
ize the community of Mount Ephraim with the degree of definite-
ness necessary to determine the need for this specific ordinance.
73
Justice Stevens reasoned that although the first amendment is at-
tentive to more serious matters than live nude dancing, it never-
theless requires, when the record is unclear, that the burden of
showing the adverse effect of live entertainment on the community
be placed on the Borough.7 '
Justice Stevens concluded that Mount Ephraim had not met this
burden of persuasion and had left the Court to speculate as to the
Borough's reasons for attacking the appellants' business and as to
the justification for the distinction drawn by Mount Ephraim be-
tween live and other forms of entertainment.76 He reasoned that
while local government ordinarily need not justify the means cho-
sen to effectuate its zoning policy, when first amendment interests
are implicated, a municipality is required to show that it is regulat-
ing expressive activity pursuant to a uniform policy.76 Further, he
maintained such a policy must be implemented by a restriction
70. Id. at 80 (Stevens, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 79-80 (Stevens, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 80 (Stevens, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 83 (Stevens, J., concurring).
74. Id. Justice Stevens qualified this statement, explaining that in unspecified in-
stances he might presume that live nude dancing has an adverse impact on a community
when the challenged ordinance is narrowly drawn to separate such live entertainment from
other permitted uses. Id. However, Justice Stevens could not utilize this exception in this
case because the ordinance cut a broad swath through the field of protected expression. Id.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
75. 452 U.S. at 83-84 (Stevens, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 84 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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which is as narrowly drawn as possible and applied in accordance
with content-neutral standards.7 Conversely, regulations affect-
ing expressive activity which are limited only by the discretion of
public officials are not permitteda.7  Because there had been no
showing that the proper standards had been applied by Mount
Ephraim to the appellants' business, 9 Justice Stevens agreed with
the majority that the appellants' convictions should be reversed.' 0
Chief Justice Burger, in a dissenting opinion,1 categorized the
Borough of Mount Ephraim as a quiet, "bedroom" commmunity!
and grounded his opinion that the lower court convictions should
be affirmed on that basis.' 3 The Chief Justice noted that, in appli-
cation the ordinance was merely an exercise of the community's
power to determine what is best for its residents with regard to
their health, safety, and welfare, a power which has been upheld
under past Supreme Court decisions.'4 Unlike the majority, Chief
Justice Burger characterized the case as involving a valid attempt
by a tiny residential community to exclude commercial nude danc-
ing from their quiet confines. 86 According to the Chief Justice, the
breadth of the ordinance's restriction should be defined by its ap-
plication and not by its potential literal meaning as the majority
had held;"a therefore, because this ordinance, as applied, operated
only as a ban on nude dancing, analysis of a potential ban on live
77. Id.
78. Id. Justice Stevens did not think that a uniform, recognizable policy was discern-
able from the Mount Ephraim ordinance, and observed that the Borough itself had offered
varying interpretations of the prohibition throughout the stages of the litigation. These in-
terpretations ranged from a ban of commercial live entertainment to a total rejection of all
commercial entertainment. Id. at n.10. (Stevens, J., concurring).
79. Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Powell that residential communities could
maintain the status quo by banning commercial entertainment when all commercial activity
is excluded. He concluded, however, that Mount Ephraim did not qualify as a purely resi-
dential community. Id. at n.11 (Stevens, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 85 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens refused to embrace the major-
ity's overbreadth finding. Id.




84. Id. at 85-86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33
(1954) (upholding a District of Columbia redevelopment act which authorized a redevelop-
ment agency to acquire and assemble real property for the redevelopment of blighted
property).
85. 452 U.S. at 85-86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
Vol. 21:259
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entertainment should have been saved for future consideration.87
Additionally, Chief Justice Burger declared that the breadth of
an ordinance should be questioned only when it is used to restrain
expression not justified by the community's legitimate objective."s
He viewed the community's battle to preserve their basic character
from the invasion of nude dancing as sufficient justification for
possible shoddy draftsmanship and overbreadth challenge.8 9 The
Chief Justice found it clear that the introduction of live nude
dancing had to have had a detrimental impact on this quiet com-
munity, especially since the storeowners had ignored the objections
of the community by interjecting this form of expression within its
periphery.90
Agreeing with Justices Powell and Stevens, Chief Justice Burger
noted that even if nude dancing was protected under the first
amendment, the Borough could prohibit it.e" He specified that
merely because a form of expression is entitled to some constitu-
tional protection, it does not become invulnerable to government
regulation.2 The Chief Justice stated that a community should be
able to decide what uses it will permit and not be required to face
an all-or-nothing proposition regarding commercial exploitation of
protected expression, commenting that one form of desired com-
mercial use should not be held at ransom to force the acceptance
of all other types.93
Zoning regulations restricting forms of commercial expression
from designated areas of a community have generally been held to
be a valid exercise of a community's police power and not violative
of the due process or equal protection clauses of the United States
Constitution.9 4 When the object of the regulation is a sexually-ori-
ented form of commercial expression, such as an adult bookstore
offering live nude dancing, first amendment considerations are im-
87. 452 U.S. at 86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice commented that if the
community utilized the ordinance to prohibit a high school performance of The Sound of
Music, only then should this aspect of first amendment protection be considered. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 86-87 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
91. Id. (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976)).
92. 452 U.S. at 87 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 88 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
94. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); New Orle-
ans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976); Village of Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
2691982
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 21:259
plicated and the municipality's action must survive strict
scrutiny."5
Jurists have pondered the place of repugnant expression for
many decades. 6 Various forms of expression-obscenity, 97 libelous
utterances,98 fighting words, 9 -have been termed to be of such
limited social value that they warranted little or no constitutional
protection. Traditionally, two principles have governed first
amendment controversies in this area: first, a governmental body
cannot regulate protected expression solely on the basis of con-
tent, °10  and second, nonobscene expression, which includes some
sexually explicit material, must receive full first amendment pro-
tection. 101 These traditional principles have, however, been shaken
by the uncertainty resulting from the Court's decision in American
Mini Theatres.
10 2
95. See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); Erznozik v. City of Jack-
sonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
96. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), in which Justice Holmes
suggested that:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be car-
ried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.
Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). But cf. Wigmore, Abrams v. U.S.: Freedom of Speech
and Freedom of Thuggery in Wartime and Peace-time, 14 ILL. L. REv. 539 (1920).
97. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1975); Kaplan v.
California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); United
State v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
98. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). But see Gooding v. Wilson,
405 U.S. 518 (1972), in which the appellant was convicted on two counts of using abusive
language in violation of Georgia law. The words spoken to police officers were; "white son of
a bitch, I'll kill you"; "you son of a bitch, I'll choke you to death"; and "you son of a bitch, if
you ever put your hands on me again, I'll cut you all to pieces." The Court found the Geor-
gia law void on its face because it was not limited to words having a direct tendency to cause
acts of violence by the person to whom they are addressed. 405 U.S. at 523. See also, Plum-
mer v. City of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2 (1973) (per curiam); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S.
901 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
99. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
100. See, e.g., Erznozik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). In Erznozik, Jus-
tice Douglas stressed that any ordinance which regulates movies on the basis of content,
whether by an obscenity standard or by some other criteria, impermissibly infringes upon
guaranteed rights. Id. at 218 (Douglas, J., concurring). See also, Police Dep't of Chicago v.
Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
101. See supra note 95.
102. See Goldman, A Doctrine of Worthier Speech: Young v. American Mini Thea-
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Prior to the decision in American Mini Theatres, the Supreme
Court had never altered its sharp distinction between sexually ex-
plicit expression warranting full constitutional protection and ob-
scene expression, deserving no protection.103 That case has left
great uncertainty over whether this distinction still survives.
In American Mini Theatres, a Detroit "anti-skid row" ordinance
prohibited adult movie theaters and adult bookstores within 1000
feet of any two other "regulated uses" which included adult thea-
ters and bookstores, liquor stores, pool halls, pawnshops, and other
similar uses.104 The ordinance defined "adult motion picture thea-
ter" as one "presenting material distinguished or characterized by
an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to 'Speci-
fied Sexual Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical Areas.' 1o5 While
acknowledging the strength of the constitutional protection forbid-
ding content-based regulation of expression,'" and admitting that
the first amendment protects nonobscene communication from to-
tal suppression, 10 7 Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, upheld
the ordinance. He reasoned that the interest of the community in
sexually explicit adult expression was weaker than their interest in
free political debate and was correspondingly less vital.108
Categorization of speech was the apparent basis of the American
Mini Theatres' plurality opinion. The categorization was one
which distinguished between expression which is worthy of full
constitutional protection, and sexually explicit speech which merits
only some protection, the inference following that one category of
protected speech is less valuable to society than another.109 Alter-
natively, since the ordinance in American Mini Theatres did not
tres, Inc., 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 281, 301 (1977).
103. See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 11.
In determining the constitutionality of any ban on communication, the first question is
whether it belongs to a category that has any social utility. If it does not, it may be banned.
Id.
104. 427 U.S. at 52 & n.3.
105. Id. at 53 & n.4.
106. Id. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (a zoning ordinance
designed to discourage premature conversion of open-space lands to urban uses did not con-
stitute a taking); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (housing ordinance
limiting occupancy to single families construed to forbid grandchildren is unconstitutional).
107. 427 U.S. at 61-62.
108. Id. at 70.
109. Id. at 66. The Court commented that "even within the area of protected speech, a
difference in content may require a different governmental response." Id. at 66.
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involve a total ban of protected expression but merely a regulation
of its location, the Court's approval of the ordinance might only
indicate an acceptance of minimal state regulation of protected ex-
pression when coupled with an adequate state interest. 110 The
Court in Schad, however, failed to delineate the actual prospective
effect of American Mini Theatres.
The Schad majority viewed the Mount Ephraim ordinance as a
ban of all live entertainment, not as solely a prohibition of nonob-
scene nude dancing."' By using this interpretation, the majority
failed to resolve the most troubling aspect of the plurality opinion
in American Mini Theatres: that is, whether American Mini
Theatres stands for the acceptance by the Court of an all-encom-
passing sliding-scale approach to first amendment questions.1 12
This approach would require a weighing of the relative importance
of the speech involved against the governmental interest and the
scope of the challenged restriction. s
The danger of such an approach is that any attempt to rank
speech, in all its infinite forms, in order of its believed importance
must be termed unworkable, especially in light of the elusive quest
waged by the Court in defining obscenity. 1 4 Justice Brennan, in an
earlier opinion, realized the inability of the Court to find a suffi-
ciently honed tool to separate obscenity from other sexually ori-
ented speech.1 5 If the alleged chasm between obscenity and other
expression is so obscure, the division between the other various
forms of expression would be unrecognizable.
The guaranty of freedom of speech has always sought to protect
the view of dissidents.1 6 The availability of many categories of
110. 427 U.S. at 71 n.34.
111. See supra notes 30, 87 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
113. See Goldman, supra note 102, at 301. See also Note, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
456, 478-80 (1978); Brest, The Supreme Court: 1975 Term, 90 HAnv. L. REv. 1, 200 (1976).
114. See e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (1973). Chief Justice Burger stated
that apart from the decision in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), no majority had
at any time agreed on a formula for classifying what is obscene material.
115. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
116. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); Hynes v. Mayor of
Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976)(a town must further its interests with narrowly drawn
regulations without unnecessarily interfering with first amendment freedoms). See also, Co-
hen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1970). The legitimate ability of government to shut off
discourse solely to prevent others from hearing it is dependent upon a showing that sub-
stantial privacy interests are not unacceptably tread upon; "[a]ny broader view of this au-
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protected expression, such as nonobscene erotic material, would be
threatened and possibly extinguished if the sliding-scale test
gained a foothold with a majority of the Supreme Court, since the
local authority would only be required to demonstrate minimal jus-
tification for any restriction of expression falling at the bottom of
this graduated scale. Challengers of these restrictions would face
an almost insurmountable barrier to garner judicial recognition.
Also, this type of review would create havoc with stare decisis in
first amendment case study since the value attributed to the
speech at issue would vary depending on popular opinion at that
time and the composition and political views of the bench then
presiding.
In addition, the traditional dual test of determining whether a
particular expression is protected and, if so, what legitimate state
interests with a properly drawn statute justify an intrusion thereon
remains tantalizingly simple when compared to the sliding-scale
test. The Schad majority's analysis parallels this simpler historical
approach, regarding live entertainment as an obvious form of pro-
tected expression and then weighing the justifications offered by
the Borough for infringing on its exercise. Nevertheless, the status
of American Mini Theatres, which apparently casts the Court as a
super legislature with the requisite task of ranking the societal
value of all protected expression, remains uncertain following the
Schad decision.
The silence by the Schad majority on whether it accepted the
categorization of nonobscene sexually explicit expression suggests
two possible conclusions. First, the Supreme Court, in the half dec-
ade interim between the Schad and American Mini Theatres deci-
sions, may have decided that the category of protected erotic
materials in Schad deserved the same treatment along traditional
first amendment guidelines as other forms of protected expression.
Alternatively, if the sliding-scale approach has not been discarded,
it must be assumed that the Schad court did not apply it here
because the challenged ordinance represented a total prohibition
on access while the Detroit ordinance embodied a partial restric-
tion on location.
thority would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of
personal predilections." Id. The Court also recognized that much expression serves a dual
communication function, conveying not only ideals of measurable explanation, but also ones
of undescribable emotion. Id.
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The former alternative is hesitantly encouraged by Chief Justice
Burger's reliance in his Schad dissent on a belief that the restric-
tion was justified by legitimate government concerns.11 7 This sug-
gests that the Chief Justice may have yielded to the four dissent-
ing members of the court in American Mini Theatres who
emphatically argued that in the absence of a determination of ob-
scenity, all speech is equally worthy of constitutional protection. 8
The American Mini Theatres dissenters reiterated a cardinal rule
of first amendment jurisprudence: that time, place, and manner
regulations affecting protected expression must be content-
neutral. "9
Unfortunately, it is not likely that the Chief Justice has em-
braced the logic of the American Mini Theatres dissents since he
had joined the plurality's categorization of nonobscene sexually ex-
plicit speech in an effort to increase the scope of a municipality's
zoning authority with regard to these unpopular forms of expres-
sion. His Schad dissent tracks a long line of decisions dating from
the 1970s in the obscenity and quasi-obscenity area, all affirming
the state's power to regulate within an extremely wide range of fac-
tual situations.1 20 In Schad, the Chief Justice did not concern him-
self with the majority's fear of the potential abuse inherent in the
expansive Mount Ephraim ordinance, claiming that any improper
application should be dealt with as it arises. 21 If this manner of
construction were accepted by a majority of the Court, local zoning
authorities could draft very broad ordinances, restricting various
establishments offering assorted entertainment, and enforce it suc-
cessively, thereby requiring numerous law suits to define its consti-
tutional limits. This notion is in direct opposition to previous
Court holdings that the chilling effect of vague statutes upon the
exercise of constitutionally protected behavior requires that they
specifically enumerate the prohibited action. 122
117. 452 U.S. at 86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See supra notes 91-92 and accompany-
ing text.
118. 427 U.S. at 84, 88.
119. Id. at 86. See Erznozik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Police Depart-
ment of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
120. See, e.g., Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978); Marks v. United States,
430 U.S. 188 (1977); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
121. 452 U.S. at 86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
122. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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If the second alternative indicates the present status of Ameri-
can Mini Theatres, requiring the Court to act as a super legisla-
ture ranking the societal value of all protected expression, a deter-
mination of what lesser protection this category of nonobscene
sexually oriented expression deserves will not be available until a
majority of the Court upholds a narrowly drawn ordinance banning
this form of expression for reasons insufficient to ban protected
and allegedly more valuable expression.
The Schad court thus avoided the question of what societal
value should be placed on live nude dancing by resolving the issue
on the basis of whether the prohibition on live entertainment was
justified. By doing so, the Court greatly limited the importance of
this decision. The Schad court relied on the traditional dual analy-
sis, determining whether the challenged statute was narrowly
drawn and served sufficiently substantial government concerns. 12 3
The Schad court refused to consider the applicability of American
Mini Theatres to this form of adult entertainment, relying on the
distinction that the Mount Ephraim ordinance totally prohibited
this expression instead of merely dispersing its availability, when
in fact the American Mini Theatres' plurality spoke in terms of
content, and not merely location. Thus, while given an opportunity
to reaffirm the nondiscriminatory role of the first amendment in
protecting nonobscene expression, or alternatively, to accept the
categorical speech distinctions enunciated in American Mini Thea-
tres, the Schad court merely utilized the case to penalize the Bor-
ough for sloppy draftsmanship and inability to demonstrate that
this form of entertainment adversely affected the community. The
result is continued uncertainty in this area of first amendment
protection.
George N. Stewart
123. See e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 n.7 (1974) (the chilling effect upon
the exercise of constitutional rights caused by vague statutes mandates that such statutes
specifically describe the prohibited behavior); Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S.
278, 287 (1961)(statute requiring written oath that state employees had never lent their aid,
support, advice or counsel to the Communist party impermissibly vague). See also, Colautti
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
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